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In the face of the alarming destruction and loss of diversity in our
natural environment many are looking within their own religious
traditions and asking difficult questions about the role of religions
in the justification of environmental destruction and in fostering
hostile attitudes to nature. More positively, they are also looking to
see what their traditions may contribute to environmental ethics
and to a vision which may help to redress the present situation. In
this paper I hope to contribute something to this process by
reflection on some aspects of Indian Buddhism and ecology,
particularly in relation to Indian Yogacara Buddhism and its
understanding of the relationship of self and world.
Two different, yet related, approaches might be taken.
Attitudes and modes of behaviour could be examined. One could
see how a proper relationship with the environment is expressed,
for example, through the rules of discipline for the monks and nuns
(vinaya) and, in more general terms, in prescriptions concerning
behaviour for the laity. Alternatively, one might address the more
abstract philosophical ideas which underpin Buddhist metaphysics
and explore the implications for a vision of the natural order and
for environmental ethics. This paper is concentrated on the
second.! It addresses issues which impact on our understanding of
ourselves, our place in the world and our ultimate ends. In
particular, the paper explores the relationship of self and world in
Yogacara Buddhism and its implications for ecology within the
wider context of Buddhist metaphysics. Thus I hope to contribute
in some way to what has become known as 'deep ecology'.2
1 For the first approach see L. Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature:
Proceedings ofan International Symposium on the occasion of EXPO
1990, Tokyo, 1991. For Schmithausen's reflections on responses to his
paper and for an overview of writings on Buddhism and ecology see L.
Schmithausen 'The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics', in
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, vol. 4, 1997, http://jbe.la.psu.edu/4/-
schmi1.html (on-line journal).
2 Deep ecology is contrasted with approaches that are primarily
concerned with management within the current scientific and economic
framework. Deep ecology attempts to fashion an environmental
philosophy which asks fundamental questions about ourselves and our
relationship to our world and which provides an adequate basis for
countering our destructive relationship with nature. Buddhism,
especially Mahayana Buddhism, has been one of the major influences
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Questions and difficulties are immediately encountered. A full
treatment of these is beyond the scope of the present paper,
however, a few words on some of the underlying assumptions are
necessary in order to forestall misunderstanding. One question is
whether there has been a consistent metaphysical perspective
underpinning the different expressions of Buddhism and whether
these result in a consistent view on the proper relationship
between humanity and the natural environment. Undoubtedly a
range of views is found within Buddhist traditions. Nonetheless,
there has beep a continuous pattern of Buddhist thinking which is
compatible with ecological perspectives and which is a fruitful
resource for developing a deeper understanding of the world and
our place in it. Those wishing to develop an environmental
philosophy drawing on the insights of Buddhism and those who
wish to engage in a wider dialogue on ecological issues can
profitably turn to these traditions.
The question has also been asked whether abstract religious
ideas and the distinctions found in metaphysical doctrines can
have any bearing on our current ecological problems, and whether
they can influence people's everyday behaviour. Clearly they do.
Apparently abstract ideas can have far-reaching consequences and
wield an enormous power doubly difficult to see if they form part of
the largely unconscious assumptions of a culture. The current
ecological crises stem from certain ideas about ultimate reality, the
world and humanity. The current application of technology is one
consequence of these views. Conversely, if our thinking about
ourselves and the world is awry, no amount of 'resource
management' will rectify the situation.
As to individual behaviour, it has been observed that
environmentfll damage is almost as extensive in ostensibly
Buddhist countries of the East as it is in the West. It must be
noted that, whatever the ultimate philosophical position of
Buddhism (or any other religious tradition), ordinary unenlightened
beings, in other words, the vast majority, will act out of desire for
security and pleasure, and aversion to insecurity and pain. Of
critical importance are the traditional restraints on behaviour and
the inhibitions on unbridled greed. These restraints and
inhibitions ~re ultimately based on a vision of the place of
in the emergence of deep ecology. For the first use of the term 'deep'
ecology', see Arne Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range
Ecology Movements: A Summary', in Inquiry 16, Oslo 1973, pp. 95-
100.
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humanity in a wider totality. If these restraints are overthrown
and an ideology that justifies and promotes rampant consumerism
is backed by a technology apparently capable of satisfying human
desires, the results are predictable whether one is in an ostensibly
Buddhist culture or any other.
There are also difficulties in the application of Buddhist ideas
to contemporary problems and questions and the use, or misuse, of
Buddhist ideas through inadequate attention to, or ignorance of,
the contexts in which they were formed and evolved. To represent,
for example, the Bodhisattva, a being intent on the awakening of
all beings, as a kind of enlightened environmental activist is one
obvious distortion. Such a conception involves, at the very least, a
new departure in the understanding of the function of compassion
which the Bodhisattva embodies.! Informed scholarship has an
obvious corrective role in this and similar situations. From another
perspective, it is as well to remember that religious traditions
everywhere grow and develop as they come into contact with
different situations; the danger is that the emerging tradition
betrays its own inheritance in fixating on immediate concerns.
The issue of the various meanings of 'nature' is a large one
which we cannot enter into here, as is the question of possible
Buddhist equivalents for some of these meanings.2 But it is worth
noting that a notion central to our modern idea of nature viz. a
closed system whose relations are capable, at least in principle, of
mathematical expression is one foreign to Buddhism. 'Nature', in
Buddhist perspective, is not understood as a self-enclosed system
nor as a thing in itself and so was neither understood as perfect in
its untouched state (as some Romantics would have it) nor as
something whose value derived from its utility to human beings.
The question of the value of 'nature' was thus neither posed nor
answered. Our starting point, on the simplest level (and leaving
aside questions of equivalence) is the understanding of the sentient
beings (sattvaloka) and their relationship with the container-like
world (bhajanaloka) in which they live. In more existential terms,
we are concerned with sentience, embodiment and engagement.
1 On some of problems in the presuppositions underlying Buddhist
environmentalism see lan Harris, 'How Environmentalist is
Buddhism?', in Religion, vo!. 21, 1991, pp. 101-14
2 See ibid., pp. 105-7. For a study of the status of 'nature' ~ee B. Foltz,
Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental EthICS, and the
Metaphysics oENature, New Jersey, 1995.
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Let us turn now to the intellectual roots of our environmental
predicament. Clearly there is insufficient space to explore these in
depth but a preliminary sketch is essential to provide some
background for the discussion of Buddhist perspectives.
Some have found the origins of the present crisis in the
injunction found in Genesis 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the
earth and subdue it: and have dominion', which would appear to
sanction a rapacious attitude toward the earth and encourage the
idea that the only value of nature lies in its relation to human
needs and desires. Humanity in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is
argued, is created in the image of God and is to be distinguished
from nature which, not so created, can have only instrumental
value.1 Others point to the body-soul dualism in Greek thought; a
dualism that emphasises the value of the soul over body, of spirit
over matter, of man (as a psychic monad) over nature, with a
consequent devaluing of the body and natural environment. This
body-soul dualism was in turn inherited by Christianity and
influenced the understanding of Biblical tradition.2 Others point to
aspects of Greek metaphysics that were to have tremendous
impact on the development of Western views of the world and on
the emergence of science and technology. They point to the atomism
of Leucippus and Democritus, which was revived during the
Scientific Revolution3 and, furthermore, to the substantialist
ontology of Aristotle which emphasises the separate existence of
things and proposes the idea of individual substance as that which
makes a thing what it is.4 Atomism and the idea of individual
substance emphasises separateness against organic unity. This
1 Genesis 1:28. The indictment of Judaism and Christianity is
commonplace in the environmental movement. It is usually based on a
rather shallow understanding of Biblical tradition. For a more
balanced appraisal of the Christian perspective see Wendell Berry,
'Christianity and the Survival of Creation', in Sex, Economy, Freedom &
Community, New York, 1993, P. Sherrard, The Eclipse of Man and
Nature, Colombo, 1987 and Paul Collins, God's Earth: Religion as if
matter really mattered, Melbourne, 1995
2 See Paul Collins, Ope cit., pp. 96-110.
3 See J. Baird Callicott, 'The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology', in
Nature in Asian Traditions ofThought, ed. J. Baird Callicott and Roger
T.~es,AJbany, 1989, pp. 51-64, pp. 52ff.
4 See Sherrard Ope cit., pp. 51 ff. where Sherrard contrasts the Platonic
view and discusses the theological and anthropological implications of
Aristotle's position. On the difference between the Aristotelian view
and the holistic conceptions of the Eliatics and neo-Platonists see
Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Indianapolis,
1983, p. 46.
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may result in a view in which mechanical inertness and
individuality are favoured at the expense of relationship and
organic interdependence. The full impact of such thinking was not
felt until the emergence of the mechanistic world view in the 17th
century.!
Related to substantialist ontology is an epistemological
orientation present in much Western metaphysics (exemplified in
Aristotelian thinking) which sees truth in terms of correspondence
between an object and human perception or judgement. Objects
are thus wrenched from a more basic embeddedness, as is the
subject who assumes the status of disinterested spectator. In this
lies the seed of the idea that things can be objectively known and,
if correctly 'interrogated', can be forced to reveal their secrets to the
knowing subject and to yield to human control.
These intellectual currents have a complex history in Western
thought and it would require a great deal of space to fully treat
them. Furthermore, many other related factors and ideas could be
fruitfully explored: for example, the Protestant 'disenchantment of
the world',2 the idea of progress,3 the change in the idea of work,4
androcentrism and patriarchal attitudes.5
A critical confluence of factors occurred in the 16th century and
underwent further development in the 17th century finding
expression in influential philosophers such as Rene Descartes and
Francis Bacon and in the world picture of Newton. The various
philosophies of the Scientific Age may have differed in detail but
behind them all lay a cleavage between spirit and matter, soul and
body, humanity and nature. These philosophies were to find
application in industrial technology, in what Descartes described
as an 'infinity of devices'.6
1 By which time certain compensating elements in Aristotelianism, such
as, the idea of 'hidden powers' in things, had been jettisoned. See
Guignon, Ope cit., p. 162.
2 See P. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements ofa Sociological Theory of
Religion, New York, 1969, ch. 5.
3 For a discussion· contrasting traditional and modern conceptions of time
and progress see Lord Northbourne, 'Looking Back on Progress', in The
Unanimous Tradition, ed. Ranjit Fernando, Colombo, 1991, pp. 159-
68.
4 See Roger Sworder, Mining, Metallurgy and the Meaning of Life,
Quakers Hill, 1995, ch. 6.
5 See Carolyn Merchant, The Death ofNature: Women, Ecology, and the
Scientific Revolution, New York, 1980.
6 Discourse on Method, vi. 62, cit. in Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and
Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes and Nietzsche, New
Haven, 1993, p. 147.
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A radical dualism is at the very heart of Descartes' philosophy.
In his search for philosophical certainty, for the grounds for the
justification of knowledge, Descartes argued that there are two
kinds of real things or substances, i.e., things which can exist
independently without any other thing. The soul or mind according
to Descartes is a thinking thing (res cogitans) whose essential
nature is rationality while matter is an unthinking thing that can
be measured (res extensa) and known objectively. There is thus a
thoroughgoing dualism between mind and matter, between soul
and body. The natural world, understood to be separate from
mind, soul or consciousness, is, in accordance with Descartes'
mathematical method, reduced to one homogenous type, subject to
measurement or quantification. This new way of understanding
does not involve the discovery of new facts but rather involves a
new vision, a new blueprint. It involves what Guignon calls a
'mathematical projection' whereby 'entities come to be seen as
interchangeable bits with no inner principles or internal relations
to other components of nature'.1 What counts as real has changed:
all that cannot be quantified and mathematically represented is
excluded. An important shift has taken place in how nature is
understood. Everything spiritual, all sacred powers, all
consciousness, all purpose, all meaning is excluded.2 The material
world is soulless, mechanical and devoid of any spiritual
properties. The central metaphor is that of a machine, subject to
mechanical forces and governed by mathematical laws.
Since the natural world is devoid of consciousness or meaning, if
it is to have any value it can only be a utilitarian one: the value of
the natural world must lie in its usefulness in enhancing man's
power. The machine with all its separate parts can be known,
controlled and mastered. With the new knowledge, Descartes
(echoing Bacon) claims, 'we can employ these entities for all the
purposes for which they are suited, and so make ourselves masters
and possessors of nature'.3 The world known objectively
(quantifiably) becomes raw material, a resource to be exploited
through technology. Evidently, Bacon and Descartes did not
envisage that, finally, the human person too might become a
resource; that technology might claim humanity.
1 Guignon Ope cit., p. 163.
2 This was foreshadowed by the Protestant 'disenchantment of the
world'. See Berger, Ope cit., ch. 5.
3 Discourse on Method, vi. 62. For a discussion of Descartes as a
Baconian, see L. Lampert, Ope cit., ch. 6.
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The conceptual framework of Descartes was bequeathed to
Newton and passed on with some modifications by Newton to the
scientific world at large. Newton searched not for philosophical
certitude as did Descartes but for a comprehensive explanation of
the natural world. Newton proposed in place of Descartes'
'universal mathematics', a 'universal mechanics' that would
explain the world system and which would 'derive the rest of the
phenomena of Nature, by the same kind of reasoning from
mechanical principles'.!
The dualistic epistemology which promised knowledge and
control of the natural world to the knowing subject found
confirmation in the proliferation and obvious power of technology.
The mechanical picture of nature and the associated
epistemological view, although increasingly questioned, has
remained dominant until the present time.
Let us now turn to Buddhism. The Buddha was first and foremost
concerned with the problem of du1)kha (suffering/unsatis-
factoriness) and its end.2 His basic teachings indicate the futility
and impossibility of finding ultimate satisfaction in what is
impermanent and without enduring essence. This is not to say
that the world is evil, or that despair is a rational response to the
situation, or that the world is valueless, as some have suggested.
The world is not taken as a thing which could be rejected through
aversion nor, in the final analysis, is it a thing to be grasped
through desire. The Buddha's teaching does not aim to condemn
the world but rather to enable us to recognise that it is not and
never can be a domain that can satisfy the craving of the self or
ego; a self mistakenly taken to be independent, autonomous, and
enduring. The very attempt to turn the world to our own ends can
only result in pain and further entanglement. Descartes' idea that
we could become 'masters and possessors of nature', according to
this understanding, contains a double error: it is mistaken both
about the self and about the world.
The attitude of the Buddha as portrayed in the early texts
seems to have been to eschew metaphysical speculation. Early
Buddhism appears to adopt a purely pragmatic approach to the
1 Principia, preface to the first edition, cit. in M. Buckley, At the Origins
of Modern Atheism, New Haven, 1987, p. 100. Newton was,
nonetheless, aware of the shortcomings of a purely mechanical model
and struggled to locate his world view within a larger spiritual
universe.
2 'Two things I teach: suffering and the cessation of suffering'. Majjhima
Nikaya I. 40. The Four Noble Truths are an elaboration of these two.
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realisation of its soteriological objective, the end of suffering. Yet,
the Noble Eightfold Path begins with 'complete understanding'. It
implies, at the very least, a critique of certain approaches to
metaphysics. The philosophical force of 'complete understanding' is
to effect a deconstruction of essentialist and substantialist errors.
The central error is belief in a self or enduring ego (atmadr$ti
satkayadr$ti), the precondition for the operation of greed and
hatred. If the soteriological objective of nirvaI}.a is to be realised
this error must be rooted out.!
But the error of an enduring and separate self is by no means
the end of the matter: it is simply the case of substantialist and
essentialist thinking with the most pernicious consequences.
When the philosophical implications are made more explicit, as
they are ill the teaching of the Abhidharma (Higher Doctrine) and
in the philosophical schools, the anti-essentialism and anti-
substantialism is seen to be far more wide reaching: all wholes or
things are seen to be lacking any essence, substantial existence or
individual being (svabhava).2 All arise in mutual dependence and,
on analysis, will be found to 'disappear' into the causes and
conditions of their arising and persistence.3 The notion of a thing,
of an individual being (bhava), is an abstraction or thought
construction (kalpana) in which a 'thing' is made to appear
different to and more than the sum total of its causes and
conditions.'
Early Buddhist philosophers attempted to express this insight
within a framework that later Buddhist philosophy, especially that
of the Mahayana, found to be inadequate. The early Buddhist
philosophers rejected (as do all Buddhists) the distinction between
substances and qualities in the sense of qualities belonging to a
substance or qualities inhering in a substance, and of a substance
enduring over time. Some early Buddhists nonetheless argued -
and here, flccording to the later philosophers, they went astray -
that all conventional 'things', all conditioned existence, both
subjective and objective, could be analysed in terms of an
irreducible number of momentary qualities or dharmas, which
1 This does not involve 'elimination of the self: there is no self to
eliminate!
2 The term pudgala usually translated as 'person' is applied
philosophically to all 'wholes' such as tables, chairs, mountains etc.
The individual existence of all pudgala is only conventionally valid, Le.,
only valid from the point ofview of everyday speech.
3 The more a thing is investigated the more it disappears: yatha
yatharthas cintyante visiryante tatha tatha. Dharmakirti,
PramB1)avarttika 11, 209.
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might be regarded as the ultimate constituents of all 'wholes'. They
were to be severely criticised for falling prey to a variety of
essentialism contrary to the teaching of dependent arising
(pratityasamutpada) which was accepted by all the schools.
According to this doctrine all conditioned dharmas arise and perish
in dependence on others. The critics of the views that dharmas are
ultimate constituents argued as follows: that which arises in
dependence on others, cannot have an essence or being of its own
(Le., independent of others) and thus cannot be an irreducible
'building block'. Those philosophers who maintained the ultimacy
of dharmas were considered guilty of a subtle kind of clinging to
'things' under the guise of dharmas.
The most thoroughgoing critics were the Madhyamika (Middle
Way) philosophers headed by Nagarjuna who argued that the true
middle way must reject the notion of separateness and
ultimateness of any 'thing' whatsoever, dharmas included. In
reaffirming what they understood to be the true teaching of the
Buddha and the essential meaning of dependent arising the
Madhyamika philosophers asserted that all things are empty
(siinya) in the sense that all things, including dharmas, are
without self (anatman, nairatmya) and without independent
existence (ni1).svabhava). Not only are all wholes empty but so are
all constituents.! The attempt to build an ontology - an account of
what there is - in terms of existent things (bhava) is futile.
One of the fallacies, to which the early philosophers had
succumbed, the Madhyamikas argued, was to set in opposition, on
one side, the world of conditioned dharmas (saIpsara), and on the
other, the absolute (nirvat.ta).2 Only if one accepts a substance-
based ontology where different kinds of things can be set against
each other is this possible. Once the notion of thingness breaks
down and emptiness or no-thingness (siinyata) is realised this
distinction can no longer be maintained. The realm of conditioned
dharmas, the realm of birth and death, the realm of salpsara, has
no separate existence to, cannot be set apart from, the world of
nirvaI)a. Likewise the world of nirvat.ta does not stand apart from
sarpsara: the realm of nirvaI).a is not a self-existent reality beyond
the everyday world. Immediate reality is not to be negated for a
hypostatised ultimate. Ontologically there is no difference between
them. The difference is one of existential realisation. As Nagarjuna
1 Two-fold non-self of wholes and constituents: pudgalanairatmya,
dharmanairatmya.
2 Understood as an unconditioned (asaJ1lskrta) dharma.
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clearly states: 'The realm of nirvaI)a is the realm of salpsara.
Between the two there is not the slightest difference whatsoever'.'!
Let us now turn to the Yogacara school before looking at the
ecological implications. The Yogacara (Yoga Practice) school of
Buddhism emerged beside the Madhyamika (Middle Way) school
as one of the main schools of Mahayana Buddhism in India during
the Gupta period. Its early development is obscure. The great
scholar-sages Asanga and Vasubandhu, who probably wrote
during the fourth and fifth centuries, are the leading systematisers
and exponents of Yogacara thinking, marking its mature phase of
development in India. Yogacara agrees with other schools of
Buddhism in its acceptance of the noble truths concerned with
arising of dU{1kha (suffering/unsatisfactoriness) and its cessation.
It shares with the Madhyamika school the teaching on emptiness
(sunyata), the lack of independent existence of all phenomena and
the consequent impossibility of building an ontology on the basis of
existent 'things' (bhava). Like other schools, Yogacara understands
the notion of a separate individual ego or self as the primary
delusion which keeps beings bound in the cycle of suffering.
The Yogacara represents a new articulation of the Buddha's
teaching within the framework of the Mahayana and a new
perspective on the import of those teachings. Whereas the
Madhyamika approach is analytical and critical, the Yogacara
perspective is existential and experiential and seems to have
emerged out of reflection on meditative experience. The name of the
school ('Yoga Practice') reflects this orientation. Yogacara takes
consciousness and the appearance of things to consciousness as its
starting point.2 The fundamental error, according to Yogacara
thinking, is the split that occurs in our experience which sees the
elaboration of a world of graspable or apprehensible objects
(grahya) standing against the apprehending or grasping subject
(grahaka). The Sanskrit terms for the two aspects of false duality
mean quite literally 'grasper' (grahaka) and 'graspable' (grahya).3
False consciousness takes the two as independent realities. The
sage ov~rcomes this false duality, discerns that they are not two
(advaya), and realises the nature of reality.
The Yogacarins rejected the 'common-sense' belief in an external
world apart from our subjective world of experience realising that
'outside' and 'inside' relate to the symbolic activity of the mind, not
1 Madhyamakakarika :XXV, 20.
2 Yogacara is also know as Vijiianavada, 'doctrine of consciousness'.
3 From the Sanskrit root grah, 'to seize, to grasp or take hold of.
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to independently existing realities.! This does not.mean as is often
supposed that they contended that everything is 'mental'. The
Yogacara School is also known as Cittamatra (mind/experience
only) and is sometimes interpreted as a kind of subjective idealism
which refutes the existence of an external world. This
understanding would suggest that Yogacarins maintain that mind
alone is real while everything else is unreal; as if mind were
understood as a kind of independent substance or thing in
contradistinction to all others. If this interpretation were correct
the Yogacarins would indeed be proposing a radically new
substantialist and essentialist interpretation of reality and
Buddhist doctrine.2
But this interpretation is inappropriate for understanding
Indian Buddhist thinking. Mind does not exist as an independent
substance. The early texts put it like this: 'Were a man to say: I
shall show the coming, the going, the passing away, the rising... of
consciousness apart from matter, sensation, perception and mental
formations, he would be speaking of something that does not
exist'.3 Thus we can say that mind, experiencing (citta, vijiiana)
means embodied experiencing.4 The Yogacarins do not repudiate
this.5 IIowever the emphasis has shifted. Here what is emphasised
is that knowable things, i.e., all things (grahya), cannot be
1 This conceptual elaboration is known as prapanca and relates to
words (nama) and what they signify (artha).
2 Walpola Rahula argues: 'It is unthinkable that great Buddhist
masters like Asanga and Vasubandhu should have developed a
philosophy to establish that citta (mind) or vijiiSna (consciousness) is
the reality - quite contrary to the fundamental teachings of Buddhism'.
'Vijiiaptimatrata Philosophy in the Yogacara System- some wrong
notions', in Zen and the Taming of the Bull: Towards the definition of
Buddhist Thought, London, 1978, pp. 79-86, p. 84.
3 Samyutta Nikaya Ill, p. 58 (Pali Text Society Edition). Cit. in W.
Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, New York, 1974, p. 25.
4 On this point see Kennard Lipman, 'Introduction' to Mafijusrimitra,
Primordial Experience, Boston, 1987, pp. 15 ff.
5 As Rahula, Ope cit. 1978, p. 84 has noted, Asanga includes citta among
the conditioned dharmas. The Yogacarln arguments for the existence of
a store-consciousness (alayavijiiana) might have pushed them towards
accepting consciousness without object but they resisted any
acceptance of this position. Paul Griffiths argues that they implicitly
accepted such a position in his study of the mind-body relation and
Buddhist meditation, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the
Mind-Body Problem, La Salle, Illinois, 1986, pp. 91-6. However,
Sthiramati in his commentary on verses 2-3 of Vasubandhu's
Trimsika, a key Yogacara text, specifically rejects non-intentional
consciousness as untenable. Griffiths seems to have overlooked this
passage.
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explicated apart from their being known. Subject and object, or
internality and externality, do not exist in themselves but only in a
relation that has no meaning outside its perception. In the
elaboration of duality 'things' and our perception of them are
always given together as one fact. This appearance or presence
(ibhisa) is indubitable according to the Yogacara but the
attribution of independently existing objects (grahya) apprehended
by an independently existing subject (grahaka) is delusion. The
emphasis, rather than being analytic and objective, is existential
or experiential. Just as in the earlier perspective mind cannot be
said to exist apart from those conditions in which it arises, so in
the latter perspective the objects of experience (including thoughts
and emotions) cannot be said to exist apart from their being
experienced, i.e., apart from mind or consciousness. Mind is an
ineradicable aspect of any 'world'. The world must be understood
existentially. The idea of 'pure matter' is an abstraction, albeit a
powerful one. So too is the idea of a 'pure subject'. The root
delusion involves a distortion which takes that which is
apprehensible (grahya) and th·at which apprehends (grahaka) as
separate - independently existing - realities. This - the starting
point of the whole Cartesian enterprise - is, according to the
Yogacara, the fundamental delusion of the 'ordinary person'.! It is
termed 'imagination of the unreal' (abhiitaparikalpa) since both
subject and object are without ontological status.
A significant topic ofYogacara analysis concerns the evolution or
emergence (pravrtti) of dualistic consciousness. Although most of
1 The elaboration (prapaiica) of a falsely imagined world that proceeds
from this is described in Yogacara texts as being characterised by 'the
appearance of an object in conformity with its name and the
appearance of a name in conformity with its object'.
MahayanasiitraJa:rpkara XI, 39. Significantly, according to Guignon,
Heidegger, in his critique of the Cartesian model, 'suggests that the
subject/object picture of our ordinary epistemic predicament draws its
plausibility from what we might call the "name-and-object" model of
the workings of language... When the name-and object model of
language is disarmed, the aura of self-evidence that surrounds the
subject/object model also tends to dissolve'. Guignon, Ope cit., p. 32. On
Heidegger's relation to Eastern thinking see Graham Parkes, ed.,
Heidegger and Asian Thought, Honolulu, 1987. More specifically, on
connections between ecological thinking, Heidegger and Buddhism see
Michael E. Zimmerman, 'Heidegger, Buddhism, and deep ecology', in
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 240-"
69. On Heidegger's inadequately acknowledged debt to Buddhist and'
Daoist thought see Reinhard May, Heidegger's hidden sources: East
Asian influences on his work, trans. with a complementary essay by G.
Parkes, London, 1996.
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these discussions can be set to one side, it is important for our
purposes to note that the emerging of the dualism of self and world
is not understood as a neutral or disinterested process. It is
accompanied by ignorance (avidya) and emotional defilements
(klesa) and proceeds from a state of mind termed 'defiled' (kli$ta).
This already deluded mind is conditioned by the forces of past
actions (salpskara) and under the influence of greed and aversion
cannot let reality be but grasps or appropriates 'things' in order to
turn them to the ends of the ego. Things are wrenched out of the
nexus of conditions which make them what they are in order to
take hold of or possess them. The self determines or defines itself
as one pole in this process. The self or ego and things 'emerge'
together. This appropriation (upadana) is a link. in a process that
necessarily involves a further becoming, a further entanglement.1 It
is a futile process because 'things' can never really be grasped and
the one who would grasp them is ultimately as insubstantial as
the things he/she would grasp. The notion that things could be
grasped or apprehended by a neutral observer is nonsensical
according to the Yogacara analysis. This subject-object mode of
knowledge is ultimately a false and distorted one; furthermore, its
apparent possibility discloses human interest, not a disinterested
and independent subject.
It requires but a few words to make the connection between our
early comments on the intellectual roots of the environmental crisis
and the light Buddhist analysis might throw on them and the part
it might play in providing a vision to redress the present situation.
The preceding analysis suggests that the roots of the
environmental crisis lie in a dualism between self and world that
finds expression in several spheres. This dualism is elaborated
through ontologies based on the notion of separate substances and
things (including selves) and epistemologies that take knowledge to
involve the correct apprehension of things by a knowing subject.
This dualism finds its extreme expression in the idea of a
objectively knowable, quantifiable, inert and unconscious world
whose value lies in its utility to a knowing subject. All schools of
Buddhism reject this dualism. The Yogacarins are the most
explicit: the apparent dualism of an independently existing subject
able to apprehend an independently existing world of objects is,
according to them, the fundamental delusion of human beings. The
1 Desire/thirst (tr$1)a), appropriation (upadana) and ?eco~ing (bhava)
arise interdependently and form three of the twelve lInks In the wheel
of saxpsara (s8.1psaracakra).
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consequences of acceptance of such dualism on the individual level
are all too obvious in a life of pervasive unsatisfactoriness. The
sage can completely overcome such dualism; others can work to
counter its spell. The effects of it can be ameliorated on the social
level by the presence of traditions, philosophies and practices,
social mores and attitudes whose ultimate roots lie in a deeper
vision.
Since the Yogacarin vision is based on an organic non-duality
between self and world it is understood that any attempt to
master the 'world' is misconceived and futile. The subject does not
stand outside and opposed to the world and hence the world
cannot ultimately be an object to master. The self is embedded
and implicated in the world; or rather, self and world both emerge
from a deeper contextuality and cannot be grasped as independent
entities.
The natural environment, in Yogacara perspective, is not inert
and unconscious. Humans and animals are sentient; even the
earth itself is called on to bear witness to Sakyamuni's Awakening.
Just as consciousness is not found independently of other factors of
existence so materiality or pure matter is never found. It is an
abstraction. As matter does not exist in-itself, the world cannot be
adequately comprehended as a mechanism reducible to
homogeneous units. If pure matter existed, it could be constituted
of purely external relations amenable to an exhaustive
quantitative analysis, but, according to the Yogacarin vision, the
relations which constitute reality cannot be reduced to mechanical
ones and cannot be explicated in a purely quantitative and
external fashion.
Since the natural world was never conceived as an inert
resource lying at man's disposal, Buddhism did not conceive of it in
purely utilitarian terms. Nor does it have value in-itself but in
Mahayana perspective only in the context of the relations which
constitute reality as a totality (dharmadhatu).
The Yogacarins and Madhyamikas also reject a dualism
between absolute and relative, and any philosophy that would see
value residing in or deriving exclusively from one rather than the
other, or that would negate one in favour of the other. Dualism is
not to be overcome by the reduction of one to the other. In the non-
dualism of absolute and relative lies the key to authentic and
necessary engagement (characterised by compassion) that does not
'use' things and beings to its own ends but realises universal
interdependence (through wisdom).
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The Yogacarins and Madhyamikas reject this dualism between
'absolute and relative not in favour of simple materialism and the
empiricism that accompanies it, nor in favour of a reified absolute
Subject or God, nor in favour of a monism that would swallow all
differences. Reality is thoroughly relational. But, as the
Madhyamikas in particular warn, we should not attribute self-
existence to this relational process. Neither 'nature' and. the
relations which constitute it, nor Mind, nor God, nor the absolute,
nor nirvaQa are self-existent. We can find rest neither in 'the many'
nor in 'the One'. The peace, the nirvaI)a, that we may realise is not
located anywhere (aprati$thita). The Yogacarins 'base' themselves
(if such an expression is permissible) in experience prior to its split
in ordinary deluded consciousness while the Madhyamikas point to
the indefinable emptiness (sunyata) in which we find no
metaphysical or epistemological 'ground'.
The Yogacarins, as far as we know, never contemplated the
possible consequences of the elevation of philosophies based on the
Cartesian form of extreme dualism to the position of the dominant
philosophy of an entire age or civilisation. Clearly the Buddhist
perspectives offer a potential critique of ontologies and
epistemologies based on this dualism and, more positively, a
powerful alternative vision.
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